Pakistan, Politics

With so many things coming out at once, a few comments:

1) Here's something hardliners in Pakistan and the US will instantly agree with each other on: the US needs to stop spending money on Pakistan and let things take their course. The Indians will disagree, of course, but, the argument goes, the US doesn't need to subsidize Indian security anymore.

2) The American government can remotely switch your cellphone on and track you to the meter if you are in Pakistan.

3) Security complications in South Asia arise because of India-Pak-China-Afghan stalemate. US pulls its money out of Pak and several things happen: Indians get nervous, spend more on defense, Pakistanis and Chinese get nervous because of India's better defense and increase their own defense, Afghans get nervous about Pak's strengthening defense, increase ties with India, and encourage border infiltration, Pak gets nervous about Indo-Afghan relations and the border infiltration, resumes undermining Indo-Pak borders... and so on and on. It's the textbook scenario for the security stalemate. It gets even more complex once you realize China's actions themselves are not in isolation and will further affect the behavior of its 19 rather-nervous neighbors. So what the US decides to do in Af-Pak will have direct implications in a much larger region. What a mess they've got themselves into.

4) Only 12-percent of Pakistani population is ok with the US. The only anti-US rhetoric there is stronger Islamic rhetoric. US's unpopularity will lead increased Islamic fundamentalism. The irony of this is that Pak is bff's with Saudi, a close US 'ally'. Actually, this is not really that ironic. US should be glad though that stronger Pak-Iran won't form as long as Pakistan is close to Saudi. Ultimately though, I'd guess they'd rather be friends with Iran than Saudi.

5) The Pak election commission actually enforced, for the first time, religious laws instituted during Zia's time. There's talks of increased fundamentalism. While that may be the case, I'd guess they're more likely creating a dust-storm for the elections. In the end, even if the Army doesn't have any power, they are likely to stay as power-players for some time.

6) Sa is worried about civil war between secularists and fundamentalists and B'desh. Times are scary, that's for sure. But that's unlikely to happen. Indians (Hindus, Muslims, whatever) don't want two religiously fundamentalist nations surrounding them. They can't work in Pakistan, but they can still move the strings in B'Desh, and they will likely do. Besides, I have a feeling most Bangladeshis understand that they didn't fight Jinnah and the Mukti war, just to see decreased Bengali cultural influence. This is likely to be a passing phase.

7) Even in the worst case, Pakistan is likely to become another Columbia rather than another Syria(?)/Yugoslavia/Congo.The wars there seem to be regional/tribal rather than religious. It's only their common enmity against the US that's holding different groups together. But here's the conundrum: the US won't leave till it's satisfied they're destroyed, and they may not break down until the US leaves.

8) Lets say Obama pulls everything out of Pakistan over a month. What would change? I'm guessing Pakistan would sooner or later reach a confrontation with India-Afghanistan over those damn mujaheddin. The US needs to worry more about Afghan drug money in Pakistan training fighters, not the other way round.

9) Greater power devolution in Pakistan would lead to problems with FATA and Baluchistan. And the Pakhtunakhtwa-- that's a given-- but that's such an old story it's not even there anymore. If the eastern provinces realized how much they had to gain through trade with India (without giving a lot to the Center or the Army), there's be stronger demands for better relations.