The ambiguous virtue of demons

Select reading from Wendy Doniger's Origin of Evil in Hinduism.

[Starts below]

A superficial difference between gods and demons might be sought in the presence of benevolence in gods, malevolence in demons, but "in Indian reli­gions, it is not suitable to call a god demon as soon as he is malignant. As Max Weber has commented,

The only qualitative differentiation that is made between these anthropomorphic gods and demons is that between powers useful to man and those harmful to man. Naturally, the powers useful to him are usually considered the good and high gods, who are to be worshipped, while the powers harmful to him are usually the lower demons, frequently endowed with incredible guile or limitless spite, who are not to be worshipped but magically exorcised. Yet the differentiation did not always take place along this particular line.... Powers of clearly diabolical character, such as Rudra, the Hindu god of pesti­lence, are not always weaker than the good gods, but may actually be endowed with a tremendous power potential.

Although the demonic nature of Rudra is more complex than Weber’s passage seems to imply, the statement that power rather than benevolence characterizes the Hindu gods is entirely justified. Zoroastrianism distinguishes between two forces, one benevolent but not powerful, the other powerful but not benevo­lent; this scheme may be applied to Hinduism, but with the stipulation that the first group (benevolent but not powerful) refers to the virtuous demons, while the second group (powerful but not benevolent) refers to the wicked gods.

The principle factor that distinguishes gods from men is immortality; there­fore, when men become immortal, blurring the necessary functional distinction, they must be destroyed. The crucial distinction between gods and demons is power; therefore when demons become powerful (often through virtue, though sometimes through trickery or brute strength), they must be destroyed. In later devotional texts, when the groups violating classification cannot be destroyed, they are reclassified-made into gods. Thus the conflict between gods and demons in Hinduism does not represent a conflict between good and evil, not because good and evil do not conflict in the Hindu view (though many texts would
support this view) but because these moral categories simply do not apply to the two superhuman factions.

Nor can it be said that the gods and demons represent a conflict between life and death. These two forces may also be said to be unconflicting in some Hindu texts (since, an the philosophy of rebirth, life-and-death together are seen to contrast with release from the cycle of rebirth); but in most Hindu texts, even when life is clearly desired and death feared, death is not the key to the struggle
between gods and demons. For although they fight for the elixir of immortality,and the gods are said to win it ultimately, gods and demons are equally mortal and equally murderous to mankind. Finally, though the gods and demons are some­ times identified with light and darkness, these are merely symbolic expressions of contrast rather than true oppositions.

The opposition between the gods and demons is purely structural; they are alike in all ways except that, by definition, they are opposed. The two groups are functionally but not essentially opposed, in conflict over the acquisition of power- the same power, but utilized differently in each case. Our allegiance to the gods is based not on moral factors but on agonistic ones: the gods always win, and so we are always on their side. (This is particularly true when "we” are the Brahmin authors of the texts; when the factor of asceticism is introduced, the alignment of gods and men is more complicated.) Heesterman has demon­strated that the Vedic sacrifice itself is an agonistic ritual between two sacrificing partners, the parties of life and death, who are symbolized by gods and demons; in the course of this ritual, the two parties change places - and this is the pattern of the battle between gods and demons, which requires, that the two opponents be basically alike, and hence opposed.

This opposition is so basic and So necessary to the myths that the gratified structuralist coming upon them might almost suppose that the ancient Indians had read Levi-Strauss and constructed the category of demons preciself in order to provide a structural counterpart to the gods, this being their total raison d’etre in Hinduism. As logical entities, the gods and demons are what a linguistic philosopher might regard as "yea-nay” or "boo-hoorah” terms: there are no qualitative differences, but merely differences relative to the position of the speaker (or myth-maker). We say "Boo!” to the demons and "Hoorah!” to the gods, and this is the difference between them.

[continues]